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State

by continuing to count the tail as a leg. The State's reading of the burglary statute 1s
erroneous as it encourages this Court to construe the statute in a way which corrupts
the statutory language and intent behind the statute to transmutate a petit theft of a

$185 item from a home into a felony for "burglarizing" a pawn shop. When Idaho's
burglary statute is properly understood, it incorporates a requirement that the defendant
actually invade the owner's possessory interest in the space entered. Since the State
presented no evidence at the preliminary hearing or at the trial to show Mr. Weeks
invaded the possessory interest of the pawn shop, this Court should reverse the district
court's order denying Mr. Weeks' motion to dismiss the information, or alternatively,
vacate the conviction based on insufficient evidence.
The State's response in regard to the particular provision of the theft statute
invoked as the offense underlying the alleged burglary is similarly flawed. Either by its
plain language or by understanding the legislative intent behind it, that provision of the
theft statute is designed to apply to people other than the original thief. The State's
reading to the contrary fails to give meaning to every word in the statute and would
impermissibly allow pyramiding of charges and sentences. Therefore that reading, like
the State's improper reading of the burglary statute, should be rejected.
For any and all of these reasons, this Court should vacate Mr. Weeks' conviction
for burglarizing the pawn shop.

1

were

be
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2
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Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Weeks' motion to dismiss the
information.
3.

Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Weeks of burglarizing the
pawn shop.

3

Impossible Crime
The State acknowledges that the pattern jury instruction for theft pursuant to
LC. § 18-2403(4) (theft by receiving, possessing, disposing of, etc., stolen property still
includes the language "by another" as an element of that offense. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)
And yet, it maintains that the district court properly refused to instruct the jury per that
pattern instruction.

(Resp. Br., pp.7-10.)

That pattern instruction gives voice to the

proper understanding of the relevant section of the theft statute, an understanding which
is evident from either the plain language or the legislative intent of the statute. Reading
it as the State does fails to give effect to all the language in the statute and would allow

unconstitutional pyramiding of charges and sentences. Therefore,
of that provision is erroneous and should

State's reading

rejected.

The Plain Language Of The Theft Statute Reveals The Pattern Instruction
Correctly Includes The "By Another" Language As An Element Of That Offense
The most notable flaw in the State's attempt to disregard the pattern instruction in
this case is that it fails to appreciate the fact that the pattern instructions were revised in
2010, nine years after the Legislature removed the "by another" language from the
statute itself.

(See R., pp.83-85 (copy of the Idaho Session Laws in 2001 ); R., p.86

(copy of the order revising the pattern instructions in 2010).)

And yet, despite the

statutory amendment, the Supreme Court retained the "by another" element as required
by the statute. See l.C.J.I. 547. The Supreme Court is presumed to be aware of all
other statutes and legal precedence when it reviews its rules. See Obendotf v. Terra

4

Spray

, 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008); Druffe/1 v. State Dept. of Transp., 136 Ida
was presumably aware

L

§18-2403(4)

the

it revised the pattern jury instructions, and yet, it

determined it was proper to keep the "by another" element in the pattern instructions.
Thus, the pattern jury instruction recognizes and reflects a fundamental
understanding of the language in LC. § 18-2403(4): it does not apply to the original
thief. See LC.J.L 547. This understanding of the statute is evident from the language of
the statute itself. For example, the statute deals with receiving, obtaining control over,
and possessing stolen property, as well as disposing of it

LC. § 18-2403(4).

'The

interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be

construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 893
(2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003)) (emphasis added). The
surrounding text is critical in that endeavor. See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867
(2011) ("the surrounding text of the definition only supports this interpretation," based on
the unambiguous language of the statute at issue there).
This means that the statute must be read to give effect to all the items in that list.
By keeping the "by another" language, the pattern instruction acknowledges what the
United States Supreme Court has already articulated:

many of those listed actions

cannot be properly applied to the original thief. See Mi!anovich v. United States, 365
U.S. 551, 558 (1961 ). Therefore, to give effect to the plain language of the statute as a
whole, there needs to be a "by another" element.

5

State

to distinguish

on
in a
in

la
applies to the original thief. (Resp. Br., p.10.)

However, that argument only

serves to disregard the language of the statute as a whole, which is improper. Verska,
151 Idaho at 893, Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867.
Thus, the State's argument, which fails to recognize that half the listed actions in
I

. § 18-2403(4) cannot properly be applied to the original thief, as it would

impermissibly allow pyramiding of charges and penalties for a single criminal act, should
rejected even at a plain-language leveL By its plain language, construed as a whole,
and as indicated by the Idaho Supreme Court's continuing recommendation that trial
courts instruct juries on the element of "by another," I

. § 18-2403(4) is not properly

applied to the original thief.
The State's final point in this

contends that the district court properly

departed from the pattern instruction in an effort to give a more clear statement of the
law. (Resp. Br., p.7) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has warned that ''any court
which varies from jury instructions previously approved by this Court does so at
considerable

risk

that

the

verdict

rendered

will

be

overturned

on

appeal."

State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998). As such, when the trial court departs from
the pattern instruction, it should only do so in a way that actually clarifies, instead of
adding to, the confusion in the statute.

See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275

(2003). "Trial courts are encouraged to avoid unnecessary appeals and controversy by
utilizing the instruction that has an accepted history defining the burden the State

6

this

n

the district court departed from such an instruction without

by not articulating

another" element

§ 18-2403(4 ),

district court added to the confusion on that point. As noted supra, that instruction, as
applied to the original thief, makes no sense when the statute is read as a whole. That
confusion is particularly evident in this case, since the jury was instructed on the whole
list of ways theft might be committed under this particular section, not just by disposing
of stolen property.

(R., p.156.)

Thus, the district court's departure from the pattern

instruction failed to offer more clarity on the legal principle involved, and, as such, was
erroneous.

Compare Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 275; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 647.

Therefore, the pattern instruction is correct under the plain language of I.C. § 182403(4).

8.

If The Plain Language Is Ambiguous, The Rule Of Lenity Applies Because The
Ambiguity Is In An Element Of The Charged Offense
The State's argument

that the district court properly departed from the pattern

instruction in an attempt to clarify what the statute actually means - appears to be an
assertion that the statutory language is ambiguous (i.e., the actual meaning of the
statute is not clear from its plain language and so it was proper for the district court to
try and distill what the language actually means).

(Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)

If this Court

determines the language of I.C. § 18-2403(4) is indeed ambiguous, it would usually
strive to give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute. See, e.g., State v. Doe,
district court erred in r. However, "where the ambiguity exists as to the elements of or
or potential sanctions for a crime, this Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of

7

if, as

to

is

us

is
is an
ambiguity as to the elements of the offense.

C

Proper Application Of The Canons Of Statutory Construction To The PotentiallyAmbiguous Statute Reveals The Pattern Instruction's "By Another" Provision
Gives Effect To The Legislative Intent
If the statute is ambiguous and the rule of lenity does not apply, proper analysis

of the legislative intent of the statute reveals the State's proposed interpretation to be
erroneous.

First, the State's reading of the statute fails to account for the canon of

statutory construction of noscitur a scoiis ("[a] word is known by the company it keeps").
Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (internal quotation omitted). Idaho Code 18-2403(4) has a list
of acts it seeks to prohibit.

When a statute contains such a list, noscitur a scoiis

instructs that the legislative intent is evident from the common denominator between the
listed factors.

See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (explaining that all the items in a list

defining the term "cohabiting" in LC.§ 18-918(1)(a) "denote a martial relationship" and
thus, the statutory language revealed the legislative intent for that statute to only apply
in situations where there was such a relationship between the parties)
Applying noscitur a scoiis to the list in I.C. § 18-2403(4), three of the listed
actions - receiving, obtaining control over, and possessing - cannot reasonably be read
to apply to the original thief. See, e.g., Milanovich, 365 U.S. at 553-54. That means the
lowest common denominator between all the listed actions is that they are committed by
a person other than the original thief. As such, noscitur a scoiis reveals the legislative

8

Legislature's

bill

2001, ch 112, § 1.

to make a

the "by another"

" Id.

, the

was not changing
it more concise

statute; it was

legislative

accurate.
the "by another"

in the

still

of IC § 1

State's reading

language

in

, as identifying

was stolen"

as

that M

9 (emphasis from

interpretation of the statute correctly
State's reading, one alternative
second alternative is similarly inapplicable to

Weeks'

legislative

behind it In the

the property

stolen by another.

original thief because there is no

language - "under circumstance as would

reasonable way to give effect to

was stolen" - vis-a-vis the original thief,

reasonably induce him to believe the

the original thief will

by the very act of taking

the property

the State's distinction, the only way to

was, in fact, stolen. Thus, even giving

9

is

in

remove
"by another" language as "superfluous" did not change the intent behind that
statute. Thus, the State's argument actually reinforces Mr. Weeks' interpretation of the
statute if it is ambiguous.
To try and justify its argument to the contrary, the State contends that some other
states have read their disposal statutes to be applicable to the original thief.
Br., p.9.)

(Resp.

However, as the United States Supreme Court noted while examining the

legislative history of a similar statute, these sort of code sections are.
not designed to increase the punishment for him who robs a bank but only
to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from the robber. We
find no purpose of Congress to pyramid penalties for the lesser offenses
following the robbery. It may be true that in logic those who divide up the
loot following a robbery receive [from] robbers and thus multiply the
offense. But in view of the legislative h[i]story of [the statutory provision]
we think Congress was trying to reach a new level of wrongdoers, not to
multiply the offense of the bank robbers themselves.

Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 454 (1959); cf United States v. Gaddis, 424
U.S. 544, 550 n.15 (1976) (reaffirming Heflin in this regard). The Third Circuit explained
that this holding, along with the holding in Milanovich, was based on constitutional
double jeopardy considerations:

"the underlying premise of the prohibition is

penological preventing pyramiding of punishment not a philosophical dissection of the
criminal activity itself." United States v. Trzcinski, 553 F.2d 851, 854 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Thus, the State in this case is merely trying to validate a scheme whereby
charges and punishments may be unconstitutionally pyramided against the original thief
by engaging in the improper philosophical dissection of the criminal act itself. "Where

10

constructions of a statute are possible, one resulting in the statute being
second rendering
... so as

conflict with

statute unconstitutional, we
[C]onstitution." Idaho

construe the
v. Leroy,

110 Idaho 691, 698 (1986). Therefore, regardless of whether other jurisdictions allow
such unconstitutional prosecutions, this Court should not read Idaho's statute to
authorize such unconstitutional practices, particularly when this provision can be read
and enforced in a constitutional manner.
Furthermore, far more jurisdictions have rejected the sort of argument the
State presents here.

Compare, e.g., State v. Anderson, 575 S.E.2d 371, 764-65

(W. Va. 2002) (rejecting a similar argument by the State based on the plain language of
its statute, which includes specific "by another" language, expressly distinguishing two
of the cases upon which the State relies in this case). The Supreme Court of Guam
effectively summarized the majority rule:
Several states follow the same logic [of Heflin] in interpreting their
respective theft statutes, finding that in enacting a receiving statute, the
legislature: "[l]ntended to reach a distinct group of wrongdoers. The class
includes those persons who receive, retain, or dispose of property
received from another person with the knowledge or reasonable belief that
the property has been stolen. The legislative intent was not to expand the
offense of theft, but to create a separate crime."
People v. Pa!isoc, 2002 Guam 9, 10 (Guam 2002) (quoting People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d
741 (Colo. 1981), en bane); see a/so Pierce v. State, 627 P.2d 211, 219 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1981); People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 1976), en bane; People v.
Smith, 938 P.2d 111, 116 (Colo. 1997) en bane ("[T]he General Assembly intended to
reach a distinct group of wrongdoers who receive, retain, or dispose of property
received from another person .... "); Thomas v. State, 413 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Ga. 1992);

11

Commonwealth v.

1254, 1255 (Mass.

Dellamano, 469 N

1

(Mo. 1983), en

1984); State

v.

reason

is

, IS

already covered under the larceny statutes and it would be duplicative to again cover
the act with the receiving stolen goods statute."), abrogated on other grounds.
In fact, the Fourth Circuit has expressly applied that rule to a scenario dealing
with disposal of the stolen property:
While Proffitt was indicted and found guilty of bartering and disposing of
the proceeds of the robbery, not for possessing the proceeds,
we conclude that Heflin is nevertheless applicable . . . . We are of the
opinion that Heflin should be construed so that when one is convicted for
robbery ... and also for bartering [and disposing] ... , both convictions
may not be sustained.
Proffitt v. United States, 549 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1976).
The majority rule is based on the understanding that "asportation" of the property
is part of the original thief's criminal act.

See, e.g., 3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 447

(15th ed.); compare State v. Gums, 126 Idaho 930, 932-33 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
actual asportation (physical movement) of the property is no longer an element of theft,
but that transfer in possession with the intent to permanently deprive is sufficient to
meet that concept). Thus, whatever the original thief does with the property upon taking
it (i.e., possess it, withhold it, or dispose of it) his actions are all part of his transferring
possession of the property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
property.

3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 447 (15th ed.) (identifying twenty jurisdictions

which adhere to this rule).

Therefore, attempts to obtain multiple convictions by

philosophically dissecting the different aspects of that transferring possession from the
owner (i.e., breaking apart the possessing from the withholding from the disposing of

12

are improper. See id. This is consistent with Idaho's theft statute, as it
as
as
property."

I.C. § 18-2402(3)

ing

the property in

a manner or

it unlikely that an owner will recover such

Thus, disposing of the property is part of the original

thief's act of theft, not a separate crime, and the State's reliance on the apparent
minority rule from other states to the contrary is not persuasive.
In fact, one of the cases upon which the State relies was not evaluating
a substantially similar statute. (Resp. Br., p.9 (citing State v. Michie/Ii, 937 P.2d 587,
590-91 (Wa. 1997), en bane).) In Michie/Ii, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed a
statute addressing "Trafficking in stolen property in the first degree," which applies to "a
person who knowingly initiates, [etc.] the theft of property for sale to others, or who
knowingly traffics in stolen property." RCW 9A.82 050(1)

Unlike I.C § 18-2403(4), the

Washington statute, by its plain language, is designed to apply to the original thief who
steals for the express purpose to sell the property to another, as well as to any other
person who sells that property with actual knowledge that the property was stolen.
RCW 9A.82.050(1 ). By contrast, Idaho's statute has no such express provision to apply
the statute to the original thief if he acts with a particularized intent, and it is not limited
to only those who have actual knowledge that the property was stolen. See I.C § 182403(4).

Since the Washington Supreme Court was not evaluating a substantially

similar statute, its rationales are uninformative as to how Idaho's statute should be
understood. Therefore, the State's reliance on Michie/Ii is wholly misplaced.
At any rate, it is up to Idaho's courts to determine the scope of Idaho's statutes
based on the language used by Idaho's legislature. See State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho

13

1,

(2007).

As discussed supra, Idaho's statute is written such that it is n
is

a

in
language of Idaho's statute, application of the rule of lenity, or an examination of
legislative intent, the State's contention that the district court properly refused to instruct
the jury on the "by another" element is not meritorious. That element was properly kept
in the pattern instruction by the Idaho Supreme Court to maintain the clarity of the
instruction, since that statute is not directed at the original thief. Thus, Mr. Weeks, as
the original thief, could not be guilty of the underlying theft as a matter of law, and so, he
cannot be guilty of the burglary allegedly based on that underlying impossible theft.

Compare State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322, 326-27 (Ct. App. 2008). As such, this Court
should vacate Mr. Weeks' conviction because the jury was not properly instructed, and
so, convicted Mr. Weeks' of a legally impossible crime.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Weeks' Motion To Dismiss The Information

A.

The Issue, That The Charging Document Failed To Set Forth Facts Establishing
The Crime Of Burglary, Was Preserved Below
The State's first response to Mr. Weeks' challenge to the order denying his

motion to dismiss the information under the burglary statute is an attempt to
procedurally default his claim. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) It believes that Mr. Weeks'
challenge to the charging document below - that it should be dismissed "by and for the
reason that the state failed to educe [sic] sufficient evidence at the Preliminary Hearing
to establish probable cause that the offense was committed" (R., p.43) - somehow fails

14

to

argument on appeal, wh

is that the district court

evidence to show probable cause that

State failed
in

in denying that

The State is

committed a

several

reasons.
First, Mr. Weeks' challenge in the district court was a renewal of the challenge he
made to the magistrate during the preliminary hearing.
preliminary hearing,

trial

counsel

(See R., p.43.)

specifically argued there was

At the

not evidence

establishing probable cause because, inter alia, "burglary is really uh, a concern with a
space. The space could be the privacy of a home, office building, office, closed vehicle,
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

And the felony, the entry with the intent to commit the

felony is centered on that space." (Tr., Vol.1, p.14, Ls.1

) In rejecting that argument,

the magistrate indicated Mr. Weeks could renew that argument in the district court.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.23, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Weeks did that, raising the same challenge in his motion
dismiss in the district court; he argued the State failed to present evidence
establishing probable cause that Mr. Weeks had committed the charged offense.
(R., p.43.)

In support of that motion, he explained "[aJ transcript of the Preliminary

Hearing has been ordered but not yet prepared" (R., p.43.) The district court implicitly
took judicial notice of that transcript once it was prepared, as it quoted extensively from
that transcript in its order on the motion to dismiss. (See. e.g., R., pp.76-77.) As such,
Mr. Weeks' specific argument about the burglary statute's focus on the space entered
was actually argued by trial counsel below at each level of the proceedings, and so, it is
properly argued at this level as well.
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Second, even if trial counsel did not preserve that precise argument to the district
court's ruling on the
is

preserved it for appeal. Specifically, that

challenge to the

decision to deny the motion

dismiss the charge based on its conclusion that the State had presented sufficient
evidence that Mr. Weeks burglarized the pawn shop. (See R., p.79.) When the district
court considers and rules on an issue, that decision may be properly challenged for the
first time on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998). Mr. Weeks has done
that here, challenging the district court's decision that there was sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause that he committed the alleged burglary and offered a detailed
explanation of exactly why the district court's decision in that regard was erroneous
(namely, that under a proper understanding of the burglary statute, there was
insufficient evidence to show probable cause that Mr. Weeks had burglarized the pawn
shop).
Third, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that there is a distinction
between "new arguments" and "new issues" in this context: "While Brandt has made a
very interesting argument on this issue, ... he has not demonstrated that this is a new

issue, as opposed to a novel argument concerning an issue previously raised and
decided on appeal. Seemingly, he presents a new theory which he wants applied to an
old issue."

Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 352 (1990) (emphasis from original).

Additionally, "Brandt has also failed to offer any reason for his failure to make this

argument during the direct appeal." Id. (emphasis added). As such, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that new argument because while "very
interesting," it should have been made when that issue was being resolved on direct
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IS
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1
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on appeal ... is
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of forces between

that the Due
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that overarching issue that they should be settled in the direct
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before this Court

Therefore, those arguments are

31
Id

refuse to address Mr. Weeks' arguments on appeal based on the

that they we re

not preserved for appeal is meritless and should be rejected

8.

Mr. Weeks Did Not "Enter" The Pawn Shop As Contemplated By The Burglary
Statute. And So, Did Not Burglarize The Pawn Shop

1.

The State's Understanding Of The Term "Enter" Is Based On An Exercise
Of Statutory Construction. Thereby Revealing The Term To Be
Ambiguous

On the merits of the claim that Mr. Weeks did not ''enter" the pawn shop as
contemplated by the burglary statute, the State asserts the burglary statute's language
is clear from its face, and so, argues the statute simply requires entry into the identified
space with the requisite intent

(Resp. Br., pp.13-14.)

erroneous because, to reach that conclusion

The State's argument is

that the term "enter" includes all entries -

the State necessarily relies on the negative implication that the property-owner's
invitation for people to enter the property is immaterial to the concept of "entry." (See,
e.g., Resp. Br., p.17 (arguing the lawfulness of the entry is irrelevant).) As such, the
State's conclusion is reached through an examination of statutory construction, namely,
an exploration of what the term "enter" includes or does not include within its scope.

See State v. Bull, 47 Idaho 336, 276
conclusion

528, 529-30 (1929) (reaching the same

as the State based on that same negative implication);

compare

People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1975), en bane (evaluating the burglary statute
which Idaho adopted wholesale, and explaining that the interpretation of that statute
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the Bull Court relied 1 was based on an analysis of statutory construction). 2

of

plain

of

IS

Stonebrook

is not

v. Chase

Finance, LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 931 (2012) (reiterating that engaging in statutory

construction is only appropriate when the plain language is ambiguous).
Furthermore, even if the State's reading of the statute is reasonable, it does not
address the fact that Mr. Weeks' reading of the statute is also reasonable. (See App.
Br., pp.14-20; see generally Resp. Br.) This is important, since the existence of more
than one reasonable interpretation of the statutory language renders the statute
ambiguous. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. Thus, when properly understood, the language
of the burglary statute is ambiguous.

2.

Since The Plain Language Is Ambiguous. The Rule Of Lenity Applies
Because That Ambiguity Relates To An Element Of The Charged Offense

The State does not address Mr. Weeks' assertion that, since the ambiguity goes
to the elements of the offense, this Court should apply the rule of lenity.
Br., pp.20-21; see generally Resp. Br.)

(App.

Since "the ambiguity exists as to the elements

of or potential sanctions for a crime, this Court [should] strictly construe the statute in

The Bull Court relied on People v. Barry, 29 P. 1026 (Cal. 1892). Bull, 276 P. at 529;
see Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1367 (explaining that Barry's conclusion was the product of an
exercise of statutory construction).
2 It is this more complete understanding of the burglary statute and the previous
decisions on this point which shows that Buffs interpretation of the burglary statute is
manifestly wrong and unjust. (See also Section 11(8)(2), infra (discussing the problems
in such an interpretation); App. Br., pp.20-28 (same).) Therefore, contrary to the State's
assertion (Resp. Br., p.16 n.4), this Court should overrule or abrogate Bull in giving
proper effect to the legislative intent behind the ambiguous language in the burglary
statute.
1
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defendant

140 at

that

this Court should

and so, the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the resulting
burglary charge.

3.

The Legislative Intent Behind The Ambiguous Language In The Burglary
Statute Is To Prevent Unlawful Entries Into A Particular Space So As To
Protect The Possessory Interest The Owner Has In That Space

Even if this Court does not apply the rule of lenity to the entry element of the
burglary statute, the State's cursory argument as to the interpretation of this ambiguous
statute - that this statute should be read to apply to all entries, regardless of lawfulness
(Resp. Br., p.17) - is unavailing. The State argues: that the Legislature amended the
burglary statute away from its common law roots, which it is free to do since the United
States Supreme Court has not articulated a national definition for burglary.

(Resp.

Br., pp.14-17.) While both assertions are factually accurate, neither actually speaks to

the Idaho Legislature's intent for Idaho's burglary statute as it has been amended, and
so, neither point is truly relevant to the discussion at hand.
In regard to the Legislature's decisions to amend away certain. but not all, of the
common-law elements of burglary, the State does not address Mr. Weeks' argument
regarding the Legislature's intent behind those various amendments.

(See App.

Br., pp.20-28; see generally Resp. Br., pp.14-16.) That is important, since the whole

point of examining statutory construction for an ambiguous statute is to understand and
give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute. See, e.g., Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at
475. As discussed in depth in the Appellant's Brief, the legislative intent behind those
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- the removal of

overly-limiting common-law elements
core concern

possessory
, pp.20-28.)

in

was

the
space

entered.

Therefore, the legislative intent, as actually evidenced by the

subsequent amendments, continues to be for the burglary statute to apply only when
the entry violates the owner's possessory interest in the space entered. Otherwise, the
statute would not be seeking to prevent any sort of independently-harmful act.

Compare, e.g., Gauze, 452 P.2d at 1368 (reaching this same conclusion); State v.
Baca, 331 P.3d 971, 974 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (same); State v. Boone, 256 S.E.2d 687
(N.C. 1979) (same).
If the statute were read such that it was not seeking to prevent an independentlyharmful act, as the State does, burglary would mutate into an enhancement for the
underlying alleged crime rather than existing as the separate crime it is supposed to be.

e.g., State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114-15 (1979).

Thus, the State's

argument would improperly expand the burglary statute far beyond the scope intended
by the Legislature, and thereby, "render the statute so broad as to make it virtually
meaningless." Boone, 256 S.E.2d at 687 (rejecting a similar argument in regard to a
similar statute). Thus, this Court should reject the State's reading of the statute, as it
does not give effect to the legislative intent for this statute.
The State's second point is similarly meritless. Its contention - that Idaho is free
to define burglary in its own way because the United States Supreme Court has not set
a national definition of burglary - completely misunderstands the point for which

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S.
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App. Br., pp.17-19.)

13), were cited in Mr. Weeks' initial brief.

did

seems
as

or

of

some

rglary.

Resp. Br., pp.16-17.) In fact, he acknowledged they do no such thing. (App. Br., p.18.)
Rather, Mr. Weeks discussed those cases because they recognize the fundamental
point he is arguing: the legislative intent behind this sort of burglary statute is to prevent
the unlawful invasion of the possessory interest the owner has in the space entered.
(App. Br., p.18.) Simply put, they show his reading of Idaho's statute is a reasoanble
one.
Regardless, the question when analyzing an ambiguous statute is which of the
reasonble interpretations gives effect to the legislative intent.

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at

475. Based only on its assertion that Idaho has exercised its ability to define burglary
as something other than its common law ancestor, the State concludes: "the legislature
did not intend the burgarly statute to apply only to those who commit an unlawful entry
into a building or structure, or who otherwise intrudes upon the propriety or privacy
interest fo the owner or occupier of a building or vehicle" (Resp. Br., p.17.) Apart from
the fact that an actual analysis of the legislative intent reveals that claim to be erronous
(see App. Br., pp.20-28), that conclusion is contrary to Idaho precedent.
Idaho's courts have repeatedly recognized a component of lawfulness in the

"entries" addressed under the burglary statute, describing them as "unlawful entries." 3
See, e.g., See, e.g., State v. Haggard, 89 Idaho 217, 230 (1965) ("Idaho Code § 18-

The fact that there is a concept of lawfulness associated with the idea of "entry" under
the burglary statute further reveals that there are two reasonable interpretations of that
term, making the statute ambiguous.
3
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1

the crime of burglary.

is committed upon the

this

or

the
V.

1

Idaho 1

1

") (emphasis

1

a case

involving several charges of burglary and grand theft as beginning when "a Boise
resident observed three individuals

. appearing to unlawfully enter a neighbor's

house.") (emphasis added); State v. Cirelli, 115 Idaho 732, 733 (Ct App. 1989) ("The
search revealed numerous items that had been taken in various recent burglaries.
Some of the stolen property was recognized by the police as items reported missing
from a storage unit which had been unlawfully entered sometime during the week prior
to the search.") (emphasis added); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct App.
1985) ("[The defendant) was convicted of burglary in the second degree, petit theft and
forgery. These charges arose from an unlawful entry into a closed motor vehcile [and]
the stealing of traveler's checks from the vehicle .... ") (empahsis added).
These decisions reflect the common usage and understanding of the term "enter"
in the burglary context: it includes a concept of unlawfulness

This further reveals the

legislative intent for that statute to apply to unlawful entries, meaning those which
intrude upon the possessory interest of the owner of the space entered.

See, e.g.,

Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 100 (1965) ("Words that are in common use among
the people should be given the same meaning in a statute as they have among the
great mass of people who are expected to read, obey, and uphold them."). Because
Mr. Weeks did not intrude upon the possessory interest of the pawn store owner by
entering the pawn shop to do precisely what the pawn store owner invited him inside to
do - pawn property - Mr. Weeks did not burgle the pawn shop per the statute. As such,
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preliminary hearing

probable cause

III.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Mr. Weeks Of Burglarizing The Pawn ShoQ
The State's responses concerning the sufficiency of the evidence are not
remarkable. The arguments on this issue mirror those discussed in Section 11, supra, in
that the State failed to present evidence at trial showing Mr. Weeks burglarized the
pawn shop for the same reasons it failed to present such evidence at the preliminary
hearing - Mr. Weeks' actions did not constitute burglary as it is defined by the statute.
Since the State simply cross-applies its arguments from the preliminary hearing issue,
no further reply is necessary on this point Accordingly, Mr. Weeks simply refers the
Court back to Section 11, supra, and to pages 28-29 of his Appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Weeks respectfully requests

this Court vacate the verdict and judgment

of conviction remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this

4th

day of December, 2015.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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